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More plea for help than defense of some 
thesis
1. A problem for representationalists
2. Naïve Realists Better Placed? A new 
argument for naïve realism?
3. Concluding Thought: A Return to an 
Actualist Theory of Experience?
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The problem of the laws of 
appearance for representationalists
3
First: What is representationalism?
•Having tomato-experience = 
“experientially representing” that something is red and round
• Rejects Actualism about experience:  it can experientially 
appear Fx à exists no F.  Relevant to the problem. 
• Everyone rejects Actualism – at least in hallucination! Leads 
to sense data and sense data bad, bad, bad!!
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What’s Problem? First “laws”, then 
the problem.  Constraint on appearance.
• Exclusion Law. In reality, in appearance. You cannot e-
represent a single object as being ROUND-AND-SQUARE.  
Phenomenology?   Meinongian believe, but you cannot exp. rep.
•Color à Extension Law. Reality Red à extended. 
Appearance. Necessarily, if you e-represent SOMETHING IS  
RED you must e-represent IT AS EXTENDED. SOMEHOW 
(even peripheral vision, quick view). Cannot have experience 
whose only content: X is red. Berkeley, Cutter
• Property-Limits Law. You experientially represent AT 
LEAST colors, shapes. Siegel: what other? But not BEING A 
REPUBLICAN.  Cannot have Only content! (Problem: is there a 
bright line here?)
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• Perspectival law: An individual cannot 
experientially represent merely that there is 
a cube somewhere in reality, without 
any “perspectival content” about its location 
and apparent shape from “here”. 
• No logical structure: You cannot have an 
experience whose only content is: either a 
red thing is to your left or a square thing is to 
your right.           Perhaps others. 
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The basic problem of LOAs for 
representationalists
1. Necessitism. Some metaphysically necessary. 3
Exclusion Law, Color à Extension Law, Property-Limits
2. Explanation Required. We need an 
explanation: why metaphysically necessary. 
3. Representationalists Can’t Explain. If you 
look at candidate representationalist explanations, 
you find they just don’t work. 
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The Prima Facie Case for 
Necessitism.   Analogy -
•Metaphysically necessary nothing in reality is ROUND 
AND SQUARE??????
•How know? Not just: cannot imagine. Intrinsically 
plausible!!
•On face of it, LOA has same modal status: 
Metaphysically necessary nothing in appearance is 
ROUND AND SQUARE.  
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2. The Prima Facie Case for “Explanation 
Required”
High Standard: Explanation = (Logical) Derivation. 
1. Actualism: Necessarily, if it appears to an individual 
that something is F, must exist something (e. g. SD) F. 
2. Exclusion-in-Reality: Necessarily, nothing in 
reality – not even sense datum - is ROUND AND 
SQUARE. 
3. Therefore, Exclusion-in-Appearance: necessarily, 
it never appears to an individual that something is 
ROUND AND SQUARE.
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What We Want From an Explanation (1)
Simplifying.  It’d be great if great variety of 
metaphysically necessary LOAs could somehow be logically 
derived from just a few more basic truths. 
When we write down our final theory, just have to 
include those few more basic truths. 
For example: single axiom of ICONICITY: necessarily, experience 
is realized by an iconic format???
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What we want from an explanation (2)
LOA: “Necessarily, it cannot appear that 
something is ROUND AND SQUARE” 
Somehow derivable from 
“Necessarily, nothing really be be 
ROUND&SQUARE.   
Hard for me to believe: two, independent 
modal truths here!!!
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3. The Prima Facie Case for 
Representationalists Cannot Explain 
FIRST warm-up point: Rejects Actualism. Appearance not 
constrained by reality.  So constrains on appearance cannot be 
directly derived from constraints on reality. Why any at all?
SECOND: other forms of representation – belief and language 
– all kinds of crazy stuff: incompatible properties; color 
without anything spatial; arbitrarily abstract 
properties REPUBLICANISM; non-perspictival
contents; logically complex content.   Why 
experiential rep NECESSARILY different?
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An argument from elimination that 
representationalists cannot explain
•These warm-up points don’t show that they 
CANNOT provide a simplifying explanation. 
•But if we look at candidate representationalist 
explanations, we find that they fail. 
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Preliminary: many (Tye, Dretske) accept two-
part reductive externalist
representationalism. “Real definition” --
NECESSARILY,  A to experientially represents that p 
IFF 
A (i) undergoes a SUBPERSONAL internal “vehicle” N 
(neural in our case) that realizes an experience and (ii) N to 
bear some externally-determined R to the occurrences of p-
states. 
Let’s assume this is right for awhile. 
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Reductive externalist representationalists
(1) Format explana-on 
concerning hidden the 
subpersonal 
representa5ons. 
(2) Psychosemantic 
explanation concerning 
how that subpersonal 
realizer gets its 
representational content. 
15
Let’s begin with a (1) format explanation in 
terms of hidden realizers. Tall order!!
(A) Metaphysically necessary truths about 
the format of hidden vehicles – apply not just to 
humans but to all possible experiencers (aliens).  
(B) They logically entail ALL the laws of 
appearance (for which necessitism is true)  What 
might they be? 
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One idea: while vehicles for belief sentence-like, 
the hidden vehicles are necessarily “picture-
like” or “iconic” not literally but:
•Parts principle: every part of the subpersonal 
representation represents a “part of” the scene 
represented. 
•Holism: every part represents multiple contents. 
Not clear that this is actually true for all vehicles of 
experience!!!!!! (Green and Quilty-Dunn). 
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A simple problem with iconicity explanation 
of metaphysical necessity of LOAs
Remember: Explanation requires 
Derivation.
Parts-Principle and Holism are abstract. 
Neither logically entails ANY of the LOA!
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Some general problems with ANY format 
explanation of necessity of LOAs
First, hard to see how explain Exclusion.   To explain 
productivity&systematicity, any theory of format must be 
compositional.  E. g.  a neural rep of motion in one brain area 
and a neural rep of color in another “bound”, computational-
functional relation.
Why couldn’t some possible perceiver be wired up so that a 
horrible binding error could occur, in which neural 
representations of ROUND and SQUARE stand in 
“binding”? 
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A second general problem with format 
explanations: epistemic
•Analogy: Water-2. We only know this 
empirically because grounded by hidden 
nature.  
•If LOAs grounded by hidden realizer, we 
should only know them empirically.  NOT 
SO!  (Is this valid argument-form?)
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Turn to (2) Psychosemantic Explanations  
•These explanations appeal, not to format of inner 
representations, but to a theory of how they get their 
contents.  
•Neander. Causal-Informational: X 
represents F iff X has the function of 
being caused by F. 
•Could this explain metaphysical necessity of LOAs? 
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•Causal Theory Explains ◻Exclusion Law? ROUND-
AND-SQUARE cannot cause.  Problem: ignores 
compositionality. Given this, causal theory doesn’t rule out: 
R1caused by round, R2 square, then bound. 
•Causal Theory Explains ◻ Property-Limits? 
Systems sensitive to colors and shapes, not abstract. 
Problem: this is only a contingent fact.  A possible sensory 
system function to be causally detect republican!!!!
•Causal-Informational Theory also violates Color-Extension 
Law. To see this, imagine Color-Only Creature: causally 
sensitive to color but no spatial properties all. (Pautz 2017, 
Morgan MS)
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Reductive externalist representationalists
(1) Format explanation 
concerning hidden the 
subpersonal 
representations. 
(2) Psychoseman-c 
explana-on concerning 
how that subpersonal 
realizer gets its 
representa5onal content. 
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What about Other Forms of 
Representationalism?
I accept a non-reductive form of 
representationalism. 
I reject Tye and Dretske’s two-part real def. of 
experiential representation – “primitive”. 
On this form, prospects ever dimmer!! Cannot LOA 
derive from our real definition of exp. representation. 
24
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In sum, the problem for representationalists
1.Necessitism.    
2.Explanation Needed
3.Representationalists Can’t 
Explain.  
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One representationalist response: Deny 
Necessitism
•All LOA contingent special science laws that could be 
violated in other possible individuals – perhaps in 
actual people. 
• If contingent, we know IN ADVANCE that they have 
neural-computational explanations (all do).
•Chalmers, Speaks, EJ Green. But I cannot deny LOA! 
No sufficiently strong reason to deny. 
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A second representationalist response (I 
kinda like)  Easy Essentialist Explanations!
Exclusion Law: In essence of E-Rep that no one E-rep 
ROUND &SQUARE. (More general.)
Color-Extension Law: In essence of E-rep that if 
you E-rep red you E-rep spatial stuff. (More general)
Property Limits. It is in the essence of some 
properties that they can (?) be experienced. It is in the 
essence of other properties – being a republican, having 
mass – that they cannot be.   Complicated and …..
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Another drawback
Treat Exclusion-in-Appearance (“it cannot appear ROUND-
SQUARE”) as a basic essentialist truth. 
Would be much better to derive it from Exclusion-in-Reality 
“nothing can really be ROUND-SQUARE”). 
Intuitively, related. This brings me to naïve realism. 
28
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Brings me to….
Are Naïve Realists Better Placed to 
Explain LOAs? 
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•LOAs in terms of “exp rep”. But we can also 
formulate them using some more neutral idiom: 
“appears”, “experience of”.  Even naïve realists 
should accept!
•So explanatory question arises for naïve realists. 
•You might think that they are better placed.
30
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After all, naïve realists hold …
Plus or minus a bit, the character of 
experience in good cases is grounded in your 
experiential acquaintance with concrete 
states of the real world. 
So perhaps they can derive constraints on 
appearance from constraints on reality?
31
One-by-one - Start with Exclusion Law
•True, in the good case, you cannot be acquainted with the 
state of something being ROUND AND SQUARE. Can’t be.
• In hallucination, most naïve realists, like representationalists, 
reject Actualism. Just like representationalists: in 
hallucination, why cannot it appear to you that something is 
round and square, given that this wouldn’t require there 
actually be such a thing?
32
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Martin’s “epistemic” naïve realism explain 
Exclusion?   
(1) In any possible situation, it IS (impersonally) 
knowable that X is NOT experientially acquainted 
with the actual state of something being ROUND 
AND SQUARE.     A priori no such state.
(2) For X to have an experience as of a round square = 
for it to be the case that it IS NOT impersonally 
knowable by reflection that X is NOT experientially 
acquainted with the actual state of something being 
ROUND AND SQUARE. 
(3) Therefore, in any possible situation, X does not have 
an experience as of a round and square thing. 
Neat – Derivation -
Other Problems!!!
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Could Another Form of NR Explain 
Exclusion?
• Primitivist NR: To have an experience as of red and round 
thing is to be in a state that is “experientially 
indistinguishable” from being acquainted with a red and 
round thing. 
• This is a “primitive” reflexive relation that cannot be cashed out 
in epistemic or other terms, but supervenes on the physical. 
• Need not be any deeper mental description in bad cases. 
34
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Cannot Explain Exclusion - Analogy
•When people hallucinate forbidden color yellowish-blue, they 
undergo a state that is “experientially indistinguishable” from 
the SUCCESS-STATE-TYPE being acquainted with yellow-
blue, even if that type is not instantiated (Billock & 
Tsou)
• So why can’t a possible experiencer undergo a state that 
stands in this relation to the SUCCESS-STATE-TYPE being 
acquainted with ROUND-AND-SQUARE, even if that 
type is not and cannot be instantiated???
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Next: Color à Extension Law.       
Selective. You are acquainted with the color, but not charge. 
Unimaginable Scenario:  Acquainted with color-state, 
nothing else. Why can’t that happen?
Even if RED à EXTENDED, doesn’t follow that 
acquaintance with RED à acquaintance with EXTENSION!!
36
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In fact, a natural development of NR violates 
“Color à Extension Law”
Color but not charge? Why? A causal 
theory of the basis of acquaintance!
Color-Only Creature: has a sensory 
system that is causally sensitive ONLY to 
colors, no spatial features.  
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Finally, property-limits?
•Why can you be experientially acquainted with 
color and shape states, but not states like the state of 
someone’s being a republican, or being the first to 
prove Fermat’s Last Theorem?
(Suppose that they accept a causal theory of basis of 
acquaintance. Then their view violates this law!!)
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Concluding Remark: A Return to 
Across-the-Board Actualism?
39
Representationalists and Most NRs reject 
across-the-board actualism, but…..
1. Across-the-board Actualism: Necessarily, if it 
appears to an individual that something is F, must really 
exist something F. 
2. Exclusion-in-Reality: Necessarily, nothing – not even 
sense datum - is ROUND AND SQUARE. 
3. Therefore, Exclusion-in-Appearance: necessarily, it 
never appears to an individual that something is ROUND 
AND SQUARE.
40
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Another reason to accept Across-the-board actualism -
it is just obvious (geniuses Russell, Moore, etc)
"When I see a tomato there is much that I 
can doubt. One thing however I cannot doubt 
[even in hallucination]: that there exists 
[then and there] a red patch of a 
round and somewhat bulgy shape, 
standing out from a background of other 
colour-patches, and having a certain visual 
depth, and that this whole field of colour is 
directly present to my consciousness.” Pound 
the table. 
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Given two reasons, take seriously a return to 
across-the-board actualism
(1)Sense datum view (Robinson)
(2)Austinian Disjunctivism (Alex Moran)
(3) Umrao Sethi’s “sensible 
overdetermination” view. 
(4)Sensa representationalism (Phil Issues 
2020)
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Martin 2006
• “the proposal here should not be read as claiming that to 
[say that the dog’s situation is not impersonally knowably 
different from seeing a bunch of carrots] to the dog is to say 
that were it self-aware it would not be able to tell its 
situation from one in which it perceived a bunch of carrots; 
or to say that were an ideally reflective agent to be in the 
dog’s situation then it would not be able to know it is not 
perceiving a bunch of carrots.”
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“When I focus on the prongs I experience 
them as straight, and when I focus on the 
‘handle’ I experience the middle prong as 
lying behind the upper and lower prongs, 
but at no point do I experience all three 
prongs as having incompatible properties. . . 
. The inconsistency present in these phenomena is not 
contained within a single experiential state but occurs 
only as one attempts to integrate a series of distinct 
visual experiences that are not phenomenally unified 
with each other.” Bayne (2010, 54)
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Berkeleyan Law
•Motion without chromatic or achromatic 
color? Well, not quite a counterexample. 
•Form without color? Kentridge, Heywood 
and Cowey (2004): MS, achromat-topsia
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•MS has a damaged coritical color center from encephalitis in 
1970. Cannot order 100 color patches (Farnsworth–Munsell 
100-Hue Test). Can perceive distal forms by way of luminance 
differences. Black, white, grey???
• But: If you place a shape against isoluminant background, 
where the shape only differs in chromaticity, MS could detect 
it!!! Experienced distal form (an edge) but not because he 
was detecting any changes or difference in luminance.
• Fiona M: alien colors!!
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Two more points
• Is subpersonal iconic format part of essence of 
Exing contents? Suppose your mom’s sensory 
systems all have discursive format. Is she a zombie? 
•Not even clear that actual format is (fully) iconic. MT, 
V4 (no accurate retinopy). Binding. Fougnie and 
Alvarez (2011) - independent forgetting. Green and 
Quilty-Dunn (forthcoming).  “Multiple slots”. 
(Another issue: Holism a bit odd psychosemantically: 
do atoms track property clusters? Novel?) 
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•When subjects are presented with figures, they 
later recall color and orientation at different 
rates. 
•This is explained if we give up Holism. The 
subjects have separate representations for color 
and orientation. The color representation can 
degrade without the orientation one, and vice 
versa. 
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